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ABSTRACT Credit unions are financial co-operatives that conduct their business for their members.
The principal purpose of a credit union is to receive deposits from and make loans to members. They do
not serve the general public. Membership is restricted by a qualification that is referred to as a common
bond or field of membership. The origins of credit unions are to be found at the heart of the Industrial
Revolution, when Robert Owen established two famous co-operatives in Rochdale and New Lanark.
The most prominent co-operative influenced by his ideas, the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers,
opened their famous co-operative shop on Toad Lane in 1844. This was an important step in the social
and political change that was taking place throughout Europe and of which the people of Rochdale can
justifiably claim to be leaders. By 1848, the Co-operative had 140 members and the society’s membership
increased to 390, by 1880 the national membership of consumer societies had reached over 500 000, and
by the turn of the century it had reached 1.5 million. The members of the two co-operatives subscribed
to shares and paid small amounts to raise sufficient funds in order to purchase goods below the market
value and then resell them to the members at a savings. These co-operatives were the result of the ‘growing
complexities of modern economic life for both farmers and workers’. Importantly, the Rochdale Society
of Equitable Pioneers developed a number of principles that have assisted the development of credit
unions. These principles were open membership, the democratic control of the organisation, a limited interest
on share capital and the return on member’s interests being in proportion to the member’s patronage.
These principles illustrate why credit unions are a unique financial co-operative. Under the guidance of
the World Council of Credit Unions, the growth of credit unions has been remarkable. In 2007, there were
49 000 credit unions and 177 000000 members in 96 countries. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it
aims to illustrate how credit unions are able to grow in times of economic hardship – a situation that is
demonstrated by examining the impact of the ‘Great Depression’ in the United States of America (USA)
and the ‘Credit Crunch’ in the United Kingdom (UK). Second, the article highlights the importance of
deposit protection schemes when credit unions face financial difficulties in the USA, UK and the Republic of
Ireland (Ireland).
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ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AND THE
GROWTH OF CREDIT UNIONS
The Great Depression
Credit unions arose in the United States of
America (USA) in the early part of the
twentieth century to serve the financial needs
of the working class, who were ignored by
banks that only catered for corporations and
successful individuals.1–5 As a result of this
snub, the loan demands of the blue-collar
workers went unsatisfied, and such people were
forced to either go without a loan or turn to
loan sharks. Banking history in the USA was
dominated by periodic outbursts from people
unhappy with the banking system.6 It is,
therefore, unsurprising that credit unions began
to meet this gap in the financial services sector.
The USA in the 1920s enjoyed a period of
economic prosperity. Novajovsky states that
during this period credit union funds accounted
for only US$11 million assets, or 0.16 per cent of
total funds held by financial intermediaries.7
However, the period of economic prosperity
dramatically ended in October 1929 with the
Wall Street Crash. As a result, there was a
dramatic increase in poverty and unemployment.
These factors, and the failure of many financial
institutions, contributed towards a demand for
credit unions.8 The Wall Street Crash plunged
the country into the Great Depression. This
turned out to be the worst economic slump ever,
and one that spread to virtually the entire
industrialised world.8 The impact of the Great
Depression on the economy was catastrophic.
Halloran states that 25 per cent of the nation’s
workforce was unemployed and practically every-
one felt the pinch of economic deprivation.9 For
the first time, many Americans were forced to
question their vague philosophical belief that
poverty was a self-imposed condition brought on
by laziness and moral degeneracy. The Great
Depression was a unique experience for many
Americans, who faced for the first time a critical
situation of widespread, persistent poverty that
affected not just relatively small groups, but the
average person in the street.10 The fledgling
credit union movement grew during this trying
economic period, as people were forced to look
for alternative forms of credit. As bank after bank
closed, people lost faith in the existing financial
system and welcomed the credit union alter-
native. In fact, credit unions did so well during
the Great Depression that the movement sought
federal legislation allowing the formation of
credit unions in any state in the country. An
extensive grassroots campaign culminated in the
passage of the Federal Credit Union Act 1934.11
The Great Depression turned out to be a
boon rather than an impediment to credit
unions, who continued to grow throughout
the period while many other financial service
providers failed or turned away from consu-
mers. Moody and Fite state that hundreds of
banks were unable to survive the depression
and closed.12 In 1931, 2298 banks suspended
operations, and the following year the number
was still high, reaching 1456.12 A Princeton
University study of the ability of different
kinds of thrift plans to survive the adversity of
the Great Depression found that 34.5 per cent
of all bank deposits had been lost, as had
35.9 per cent of company investment funds,
and 32 per cent of investments in building and
loan societies.13 In contrast, only 6.7 per cent
of investments in credit unions had been lost.14
It is important to note that as a direct result of
the suspension of banking operations and the
loss of money, people lost faith in the banking
industry. The credit union record of solvency
was superior to that of banks. For example, in
December 1931, 512 banks closed, and at the
same time some 30 credit unions had been
organised. Johnson states that during the Great
Depression the number of credit unions grew
by 107 per cent, when the number of banks fell
by 50 per cent.15 While the Great Depression
was a period of great pain to many people,
the credit union movement provided relief
from financial hardship. In fact, additional
credit unions opened doors even at the heart
of the Great Depression. Novajovsky states that
between 1931 and 1933, during the worst years
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of the Great Depression, credit unions con-
tinued to grow.16 Kroos and Blyn support this
view, and state that by 1933 there were 2000
credit unions, which held $40 million in
savings.17 Moody and Fite concluded that the
Great Depression helped the development of
credit unions by stimulating the co-operative
idea:
The depression put citizens in the mood
to try different approaches to their credit
problems. The credit union movement
undoubtedly benefited from a widespread
desire to depart from traditional practices
and experiment with new systems.12
Despite the general consensus that credit
unions benefited from the Great Depression,
there were a number of states where their
numbers dropped. For example, between
1929 and 1933 the number of credit unions
in Massachusetts dropped by 5.7 per cent,
membership declined by 4 per cent and their
assets fell by 25 per cent.12 During this
period, people began to distrust banks, and
the population needed access to affordable
credit and the government seized the oppor-
tunity to promote of credit unions.13 Clearly,
then, the harsh economic conditions in the
USA contributed towards the development
of credit unions.
The Credit Crunch
The recent uncertainty in the global financial
markets has led to a dramatic reduction in the
availability of credit. The problems have been
partly fuelled by the subprime mortgage crisis
in the USA. Subprime mortgage loans are
designed for persons with poor credit histories,
and carry a significantly higher interest rate
than prime loans.18 The increase in the total
amount of outstanding loans for the subprime
mortgage market has increased at an alarming
rate, and has resulted in a 75 per cent increase
in the number of repossessions.19 It is the
contraction of available credit that has caused
turmoil in the credit market in the United
Kingdom (UK), for example, the near collapse
and nationalisation of Northern Rock.20 What
does this mean for credit unions in the UK?
A large number of credit unions are reporting
a significant increase in membership and loan
applications. For example, in November 2008
the Local Government Association reported
that some credit unions have reported a
25 per cent increase in membership since
2007.21 Similarly, credit union membership in
Glasgow has increased by 38 per cent since
October 2007, Scotwest Credit Union’s mem-
bership has risen by 12 per cent, and the
West of Scotland National Health Service
(NHS) Employees Credit Union membership
has improved by 38 per cent.21 Indeed, the
consumer website thisismoney.co.uk reported
that ‘several leading credit unions have enjoyed
surging interest in the last few months as
growing numbers of individuals struggle to
finance their day-to-day expenses’.22 The recent
growth in credit union membership has also been
fuelled because bank customers are disappointed
by the way banks have conducted themselves and
feel that credit unions provide a safer and ethical
alternative. Furthermore, it must be noted that
during the Credit Crunch, credit unions in
the UK have benefited from an unprecedented
level of political and financial support from
the government.23 Credit unions are not exempt
from the Credit Crunch; in 2008 a total of six
became insolvent.24 However, a reduction in the
total number of credit unions is a natural
occurrence in their evolution. For example, by
the middle of the 1960s, the number of credit
unions in the USA numbered approximately
26000, yet the current number is 8269.25
According to the Association of British
Credit Unions Limited (ABCUL), membership
of ABCUL credit unions has increased from
262 000 to 524 000 and savings by over £410
million.26 As of March 2009, credit unions in
England, Scotland and Wales were providing
services to over 750 000 people, more than
doubling since 2000 when there were just
325 000 credit union member.26 According to
the Financial Services Authority (FSA), there
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were over 655 000 adult members and over
96 000 junior savers in British credit unions in
June 2008.27 Savings and loans in credit unions
have grown at an even faster pace: in 2000,
credit union members had built savings of
£183 million, and by 2008 this had increased
to £475 million. During the same period,
credit union loans increased from £175 million
to £429 million. No report published at this
time can ignore the economic situation that
we find ourselves in, and as the government has
had to step in over the past year to prop up
failing banks, it is worthwhile pointing out that
credit unions have largely weathered the storm
so far. Our simpler, mutual business model that
is not reliant on money markets and share
prices has gained many new fans in recent
months as commercial lenders have struggled
with the ‘toxic debt’ traded around the world.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES
The importance of deposit insurance schemes
in the UK has been recently highlighted
following the collapse and partial nationalisa-
tion of Northern Rock. The Northern Rock
fiasco came to fruition in September 2007, and
resulted in the first run on a retail bank since
Victorian times.28 The economic crisis was
caused by numerous interwoven factors, and
the Turner Review 2009 presents these in a
comprehensive dossier.29 However, these can
be categorised for the purpose of this article
into two areas. First, the banks took unprece-
dented levels of risks and when the global
market faltered these risks became the bedrock
of the collapse. Second, consumer confidence
in the UK banking sector fell to an all-time
low, creating even more economic turmoil. It is
important to discuss the risk-taking approach
of banks and the decline in consumer con-
fidence that led to the government stepping in
and protecting customers’ savings to halt any
further or deeper financial crisis. Her Majesty’s
Treasury determined that there were systematic
failures that directly related to the directors of
the company but also to the tripartite system
having significantly failed.30 It has been
acknowledged that Northern Rock spearheaded
the economic downturn in the UK, allowing
for low ebb of consumer confidence and the
timely criticisms heaped on the FSA and the
Bank of England. Some of the blame must also
lie with the government and its, at times,
ineffective policy towards financial regula-
tion.31 With consumer confidence at an all-
time low it is important for regulators to see
through the haze of economic misery and try
to find solutions to the problems. Following the
near collapse of Northern Rock, the FSA
announced in October 2008 that the level of
compensation for bank deposits was to be
increased from £35 000 to £50 000 for each
customer.32 This also meant that joint account
holders would be eligible to claim up to
£100 000.33 Before this incident it was 100
per cent of the first £2000 and 90 per cent of
the next £33 000. Ultimately, this is paid for by
bank levies, but in 2007 when the threshold
was raised the large banks stated that this would
be passed onto customers. Even having the
safeguard in place before Northern Rock did
not stop customers making a run on the bank
that ultimately contributed to its downfall and
the concurrent economic crisis. It is hoped that
the government’s timely intervention in natio-
nalising banks and increasing levels of com-
pensation will renew consumer confidence and
kick-start the economy into recovery. Similarly,
credit unions have benefitted from deposit pro-
tection schemes despite the fact that they have
grown during times of economic hardship.
One of the most significant factors that have
limited the development of credit unions is a
restrictive legislative framework. The World
Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) took
the view that ‘credit unions legislation has
not kept pace with the development of credit
unions’.34 Therefore, legislative deficiencies
jeopardise the safety and soundness of credit
unions by restricting their ability to meet their
members’ needs. Jurisdictions lacking an ade-
quate statutory framework have hampered the
development of credit unions.35 The creation
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of enabling legislation is the ultimate objective
of credit unions in many jurisdictions, and in
many parts of the world credit union legislation
has failed to keep pace with the growth of the
movement. Therefore, WOCCU has devel-
oped a Model Law to encourage growth. In
order for credit unions to fully utilise and
benefit from a statutory framework, the laws
need to be enforced by a financial regulatory
body. The Model Law outlines the basic
considerations required for regulating credit
unions.36 The regulatory body should have the
ability to issue regulations, set standards, obtain
information from credit unions, and carry out
periodic inspections.37 The Model Law also
provides the regulatory body with the author-
ity to encourage, and at times enforce, the
merger of credit unions.38 Furthermore, the
Model Law stipulates the creation of a Deposit
Insurance System: a credit union compensation
scheme.39 This scheme should be mandatory
for all credit unions, and its purpose is to
provide compensation to depositors in the
event of the collapse of their credit union.
These recommendations have been incorpo-
rated into the legislative frameworks of both
the USA and UK, but not of Ireland.
The USA
Credit unions in the USA have evolved into
the most successful examples of their kind
in the world. Their growth is illustrated by
the fact that there are 8269 credit unions,
88.5 million members and a market penetration
of 43.39 per cent.40 Furthermore, credit unions
in the USA have been classified as a ‘mature’ or
‘international’ industry that is at the final and
most successful stage of development.41 Credit
unions were initially regulated by the Bureau of
Federal Credit Unions. Regulatory responsibility
shifted as the agency moved from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation to the Federal
Security Agency, and then the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.42 The Bureau
of Federal Credit Unions became an indepen-
dent federal regulatory agency in 1970 when
President Nixon signed a law creating the
National Credit Union Association (NCUA).43
The NCUA are responsible for the charter,
supervision and examination of credit unions
within federal government. Its overall aim is to
ensure that credit unions can safely provide
financial services to all sectors of society. The
NCUA has responsibility for overseeing the
safety and soundness of credit unions by
administering the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), which provides
primary share insurance for 98 per cent of
credit unions in the USA. The NCUA has
the additional responsibilities of managing the
assets of failed credit unions, monitoring the
adequacy of credit union reserves and antici-
pating the risks to the NCUSIF. The NCUSIF
has four important features. First, it contains
programmes to help credit unions that may be
experiencing financial problems. Second, if an
insured credit union does fail, the NCUSIF
will make any necessary payout to the credit
union’s members. Third, insured credit unions
are required to deposit and maintain 1 per cent
of their insured shares and deposits in the
NCUSIF. Fourth, properly established share
accounts in credit unions are insured up to
$100 000.
The importance of the deposit insurance
scheme in conjunction with the interpretation
of the common bond was highlighted in the
late 1970s and early 1980s when the NCUA
came under pressure to expand the common
bond. The term ‘common bond’ first appeared
in credit union literature in 1914. It refers to
the association shared by people served by a
credit union.44 The common bond relates to
the existence of a common identity ‘where
the nature of social relationships stems from
reciprocal interdependence typical of tradi-
tional community relationships’.45 Griffiths
and Howells state that ‘every major piece of
credit union legislation, across all nations,
invariably contains a reference to a common
bond’.46 They add that ‘it [the common bond]
is a central tenant of credit union philosophy
that credit worthiness is evaluated on the basis
of knowledge that the members have of each
Ryder and Chambers
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other’.47 Three subsidiary issues need to be
discussed in relation to the common bond: the
philosophy of the common bond, what legal
relationship constitutes a common bond and
whether credit unions based on different bonds
exhibit differences (such as the type of potential
member they tend to attract).48 The philoso-
phy of the common bond includes the building
of confidence among its members that there is
some commonality between them. This exerts
moral pressure on members to repay the loans
and it is something that unites them.48 Melvin
et al state that the common bond ‘carries within
it attractive connotations of togetherness and
working for a common purpose’.49 Members
of the credit union should ideally form part
of a single community. Snaith argues that the
movement has emphasised that protection
against bad debts should be by assessment of
creditworthiness on the basis of the knowledge
that members have of each other rather than
more conventional credit ratings based on
wealth or status.50 Section 109 FCUA 1934
provided that federal credit union membership
shall be limited to groups having a common
bond of occupation or association, or to groups
within a well-defined neighbourhood, com-
munity or rural district. Credit union members
in the occupational category are those em-
ployed by the same enterprise, or in the same
trade. An associational common bond is
available to groups of individuals who partici-
pate in activities that develop common loyal-
ties, mutual benefits and mutual interests.
Members in the community category have a
common bond based on employment or
residence in a geographical area with clearly
defined boundaries.
The NCUA sought to broaden credit union
access to groups that were too small to support
a viable credit union. In addition, the amend-
ments to the common bond were essential
owing to the number of failing credit unions:
222 in 1981. These failures occurred because
economic recession, fuelling large-scale indus-
trial downsizing and closure of credit unions,
had resulted in dwindling membership. This
caused a dangerous drain on the NCUSIF.51 As
a response to the number of credit union
failures, the NCUA redefined the common
bond to comprise ‘multiple occupational
groups’ that only had to be within a ‘well
defined area’.52 The term was interpreted by
the NCUA as meaning an area served by either
an actual or planned office of the credit union.
This very broad interpretation meant that there
could be virtually any number of such offices.
This interpretation permitted the NCUA to
merge and transfer assets and members of failed
or failing credit unions into far healthier
federally insured credit unions.53 The number
failures dropped to 112 in 1982 and 40 in 1983.
The decline did not mean that credit unions
were going out of business, but that a pattern of
consolidation through mergers had increased
the accessibility of credit unions. Kaushik and
Lopez concluded that ‘the consolidation of the
movement will be a positive force for sustaining
credit unions’.54 This is a view supported by
Fried et al, who argue that mergers were
beneficial to credit unions.55 Hence, it seems
clear that the statutory amendment to the
common bond assisted the development of
credit unions in the USA because there was a
reduction in the number of credit union
failures, an increase in peoples’ confidence in
the movement, and a significant increase in
membership. As outlined above, the NCUSIF
has assisted the development of credit unions in
the USA because it provides protection for
members of insolvent credit unions and main-
tains a high level of consumer protection.
The UK
The development of credit unions in the UK
can be contrasted with that in the USA. The
first modern credit union in the UK was
established in 1960, and as of September 2006
there were 557 credit unions, with a member-
ship of 548 389 and a market penetration of
approximately 1 per cent.56 These statistics
compare unfavourably with many other jur-
isdictions.57 Despite the low level of market
penetration in the UK, there are some areas in
The Credit Crunch – Are credit unions able to ride out the storm?
81r 2009 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1745-6452 Journal of Banking Regulation Vol. 11, 1, 76–86
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
which credit unions are very prominent.58
Notwithstanding the geographical concentra-
tion, several studies have concluded that credit
unions in the UK are at a lower stage of dev-
elopment than those in other jurisdictions.59
There are several reasons for this lack of growth
in the UK: the youth of credit unions,60
inappropriate development models,61 an over-
reliance on external funding,62 ineffective
financial regulation,63 and the fact that credit
unions in the UK have no unified credit union
trade association. However, the government
has offered credit unions an unprecedented
level of political support following the influen-
tial report by Policy Action Team 14. They
were asked, inter alia, to consider the scope for
the development of credit unions in providing
access to and delivery of financial services in
deprived neighbourhoods. The report con-
cluded that credit unions were the ideal
institution to combat financial exclusion.64 As
a result of this report, credit unions were
propelled from political obscurity to the top of
the government’s financial exclusion policy.
An important part of the government’s
policy towards credit unions was the creation
of an effective and proportionate financial
regulatory regime.65 The Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) provides
for a single Financial Services Compensation
Scheme, established by the FSA and managed
by an independent scheme manager. The aim
of the Scheme is to compensate members
who suffer loss in various circumstances as a
consequence of the inability of an authorised
person to meet his/her liabilities.66 The Com-
pensation Scheme overcame an inherent weak-
ness of the protection offered by s.15 (1) Credit
Unions Act (CUA) 1979, which is that the
insurance does not cover all forms of loss,
notably failure of administration or failure
of borrowers to repay their loan.67 The FSA
claims that it will significantly benefit credit
unions because members now have access to
compensation if a credit union were to fail. Its
members are protected and a large proportion
of their savings can be refunded. When the
CUA 1979 was drafted, the Registry of
Friendly Societies refused to consider and
implement such a scheme, a stance for which
it has been criticised.
Under the Scheme, if a credit union
becomes insolvent, members will receive 100
percent of the first £2000 of savings and up to
90 per cent of the next £31 700.68 In October
2007, the FSA announced that there would be
an increase in the amount of compensation
payable on deposits up to £35 000 equal to
100 per cent of the loss incurred.69 The
Compensation Scheme clearly provides much
needed protection for the members of credit
unions. Credit unions are also included within
the same regulatory structure as banks and
building societies, and membership of the
Compensation Scheme also means that money
deposited with credit unions will be as safe as
savings left in banks and building societies. In
this respect then, credit unions are on the same
footing as the main providers of financial
services. The FSA view is that the increased
consumer protection of this kind makes
membership of credit unions more attractive,
and is likely to have a significant impact on the
growth and expansion of the movement. Public
confidence in credit unions does require this
kind of protection. Such a Scheme would, for
example, have assisted people who suffered
near financial ruin when Camberwell Credit
Union Limited was saved from collapse by a
take-over by a neighbouring credit union and
fundraising. The benefits of the Compensation
Scheme were demonstrated by the protection
offered to the members of Thameswood Credit
Union Limited. The members of an insolvent
credit union in Northumberland also received
their money back following the collapse of the
GuidePost and Scotland Gate Credit Union
Limited in Choppington, further illustrating
the benefit of the Financial Services Compen-
sation Scheme.70 Members of three other
insolvent credit unions – Fairswan Credit
Union Limited, Cathall Credit Union Limited
and Tendring Dial Credit Union Limited – also
had their savings protected by the scheme.71
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Clearly, the membership of the Compensation
Scheme has had a positive impact on credit
unions, placing them on the same statutory
footing as banks and building societies and
protecting members’ savings.
Ireland
Credit unions have been increasing very rapidly
in Ireland since the creation of the first credit
union in 1958. Between 1959 and 1969, 336
credit unions were registered with approxi-
mately 180 000 members.72 Record growth
between 1970 and 1989 saw the number of
credit unions rise to 509, with a membership of
over 1 million. By 2007 there were 521 credit
unions and 2.9 million members.73 The extra-
ordinary growth of credit unions in Ireland has
been the subject of a number of studies.
McCarthy et al argue that
Irish credit unions are recognised world-
wide for their success at combating money
lending, building membership and loyalty,
and providing an accessible and viable
community-based co-operative financial
alternative.74
Similarly, Ferguson and McKillop state that the
Irish credit union movement has ‘now evolved
to a greater extent than that ofy Central and
Eastern Europe’.75 Sibbald et al acknowledge
the success of credit unions in Ireland but
classify the sector as ‘transitional’, in contrast to
the US ‘mature’ movement.76 The position
regarding a deposit protection scheme in
Ireland can be contrasted with that in both
the USA and UK for two reasons. First,
membership of the Savings Protection Scheme
(SPS) is voluntary. Second, the scheme is non-
statutory and is administered by the Irish
League of Credit Unions, or League, not the
Irish Financial Regulator under the Central
Bank and FSA of Ireland Act 2003. The purposes
of the SPS are to maintain public confidence in
the credit union sector and to stabilise their
solvency and protection savings.77 The need for
an independent deposit protection scheme in
Ireland was graphically illustrated when the
League attempted to expand the services offered
within the existing legislative framework.
In 1998, the League proposed the creation
of a central computer system for the credit
union movement. The ILCUTECH Standard
Information System, or ISIS project, intended
that a computer system would allow credit unions
to ‘interface with each other and develop a range
of additional services’.78 The Registrar of
Friendly Societies (the Registrar) agreed in
principle with the proposal, but states that ‘the
practical and financial aspects of the project
needed to be managed effectively’.78 It was
estimated that such services would permit over 2
million credit union members to view their
accounts on line by utilising a new system
entitled ‘cu@home’.79 The provision of online
services would enable members to obtain access
to their account balances and a list of previous
transactions, apply for loans, calculate loan
repayments, and receive e-mail confirmation
for all loan applications.79 The costs of the
project were initially estimated at £40 million,
approximately £20 per member. By the end of
April 2000, however, the cost had escalated to
£68 million, and the Registrar discovered that
the League had sanctioned a £5.5 million loan
from the SPS to partly fund the project.80 The
Registrar decided that it was ‘not prudent for
SPS monies to be lent for such a purpose’.80
As Smyth notes, the increased costs of imple-
menting the system would be passed on by
credit unions to their members.81 The first sign
of dissatisfaction with the computer system
occurred in July 2000, when over 200 credit
unions refused to sign up for the project.82
Following the unsuccessful launch of the
project, the League then faced having to write
off £28 million,83 for which it was severely
reprimanded by the Registrar.84
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this article was to illustrate
how credit unions are able to grow and develop
despite the unprecedented economic condi-
tions of the Great Depression and the Credit
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Crunch. The growth of credit unions has been
assisted during both of these events by the
actions of the banking sector. For example,
during the Great Depression banks within the
USA largely ignored the financial needs of the
working classes. This snub resulted in many
customers seeking a more mutual and ethical
financial institution, namely, credit unions. The
distrust of the banking sector has also been
demonstrated in the UK during the Credit
Crunch. Adverse publicity from the sub-prime
mortgage crisis, the near collapse of several
financial institutions and the first run on a bank
in over 150 years forced many customers to
seek financial services from other types of
financial institutions. It appears from recent
statistical evidence that credit union member-
ship continues to grow during the Credit
Crunch. This article has also illustrated that in
the event of a credit union becoming insolvent,
its members are protected by a credit union
deposit protection scheme. In the USA and
UK, credit unions have clearly benefitted from
compulsory membership of a statutory scheme.
This position drastically contrasts with that in
Ireland, where membership of the SPS scheme
is entirely voluntary. It seems rather odd that the
compensation scheme in Ireland is administered
by the League, and not a financial regulatory
agency, as recommended by WOCCU. It is the
recommendation of this article that the voluntary
deposit insurance scheme in Ireland should be
placed on a statutory basis and that membership
must be compulsory.
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